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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Expectations: a major role in economics
cause decision making by agents depends on the formation of expectations.
For example, individuals decide how much to consume and save based on
economic outlook and economic agents calculate asset prices based on the ex-
The important role in expectations has been pointed out in economic
theories. One of the most famous and provocative examples is the Lucas
policieswithout considering the change of agents' expectationsdue to thepol-
icy changes and emphasizes the change of expectations in the policy analysis.
According to Lucas (1976), the policy announcement without any surprises
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tested any more because individuals already have changed their behavioral
patterns before the release of the policy changes. On the other hand, the
economy; rational agents respond to thenewpolicy inorder tomaximize their
utility as soon as the new rule is publicly available. Since the Lucas critique,
themacro economic models has been developed based on the forward-looking
decision making.
Although the central role in expectations is widely known in economic
theories, there are contentious issues for the theoretical assumption of ex-
and to be homogeneous. Under the rational expectations hypothesis, indi-
viduals make full use of available information to make decisions. Rationality
includes perfect knowledge about how the real economy and market works.
Furthermore, under the assumption of homogeneity, the economic agents'
formation of expectations are homogenized. People are all rational and have
precise information about the actual economy and markets. However, these
assumptions are too strong and counterintuitive. You do not always have
Rather, you may learn through trial and error and some of you may make
decisions based on a rule-of-thumb.
Are expectations rational, biased? What propertiesdo expectationshave?
Are economic agents are homogeneous? Before we discuss these questions,
we focus on forecast, which is a proxy for expectations in the next section.
1.2 Forecasts: a proxy for expectations
While expectations formed by agents are unobservable, forecasts made by
individuals are sometimes observable and available. Thus, forecast is also an
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expectations work in the real economy, you need forecast data on economic
prices, etc. In empirical analysis, forecasts can provide an important proxy
for expectations by agents.
The fact that forecasts are a superior proxy for expectations implies that
studieson forecasts shed light on thebehavior of forecasting. In fact, the liter-
ature examines the rationality of forecasts and how individualsmake forecast
because the analysis of forecasts allow you to consider whether the assump-
reasonable or not.
1.3 Bounded rationality and heterogeneity
Using forecasts as a proxy for expectations, there are a number of empirical
studies about testing the rationality and homogeneity of economic agents.
The past empirical studies using forecast data tend to reject the rationality
literature tests accuracy of forecasts, rationality and homogeneity of forecast-
earning forecasts, stock price forecasts, interest rate forecasts, etc. Most of
the previous studies fail to support rationality in the sense that agents some-
times showherding behavior, strategic behavior, and cheating behavior based
tional: they show bounded rationality and heterogeneity.
There is a huge amount of literature on the rationality of forecasts, partic-
are formed is examined by Gordon (1979), Mullineaux (1980), Jacobs and
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Jones (1980), andFiglewski andWachtel (1981) for theeconomist survey, Van
Duyne (1982) for the household survey, and Leonard (1982) and De Leeuw
andMcKelvey (1981) for the business survey. Most of themtend to reject the
incorporate available in formation. Batchelor and Dua (1987), Batchelor and
Dua (1989), and Pacquet (1992) show that forecasts are boundedly rational
of dynamic price adjustment based on the assumption that information dis-
seminates slowly throughout the population. Carroll (2003) shows that while
empirical household expectations are not rational in the usual sense, expec-
tational dynamics are well captured by a model in which households' views
derive from news reports of the views of professional forecasters. The model
estimates imply that people only occasionally pay attention to news reports;
this inattention generates \stickyness" in aggregate expectations, with im-
portant macroeconomic consequences 1 .
Furthermore, there is a growing number of literature on the homogeneity
of decision-makers, which support the heterogeneity of agents. The compre-
hensive surveys about the heterogeneous expectations are given by Hommes
(2006) and Pesaran and Weale (2006). Gramlich (1983), Bryan and Gavin
(1986), Makiw et al. (2003), and Capistran and Timmermann (2009) discuss
geneity. For example, Gramlich (1983) and Bryan and Gavin (1986) compare
households. Heterogeneous expectations between the policy-makers and the
1Their \sticky-information" models can explainmany phenomena that are unexplained
with a rise in the natural rate of unemployment (Carroll, 2003).
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private sector have been analyzed by Honkapohja and Mitra (2004).
By examining micro-data at the level of the individual drawn from a
that decision-makers are heterogeneous.
In order to test the hypothesis that agents are rational and homogeneous,
Chapters 2 and 3 examine the properties of forecasts with Japanese forecast
data, rather than those of the United States or the United Kingdom. They
neither national nor homogeneous.
1.4 Interdependence between expectations and
economic activity
Given the heightened importance of expectations (and forecasts as a proxy
for expectations), it is natural to pay attention to interdependence between
between rational expectations and adoptive expectations; when the expec-
tations formation of agents are not rational but adoptive, the equilibrium
9
that of rational expectations.
One of the most well-known examples that implies the relationship be-
tween expectations formation and actual economies is the stabilization policy
answers it by presenting amodel inwhich rational policy-makers learn about
the behavior of the economy in real time and set stabilization policy opti-
mally, conditional on their current beliefs. Primiceri (2006) concludes that
is the adaptive stabilization policy by the Federal Reserve that resulted in
\the greatest failure of American macroeconomic policy in the postwar pe-
riod" (Mayer, 1999). The disgraceful event suggests why analysis on mutual
dependence between expectations and real economies is one of the important
issues.
tions have been drawing more and more attentions from central bankers.
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price stability. But what do we mean, precisely, by \the state of
tations, how should we use the information for forecasting and
to those questions, but I believe that they are of practical impor-
tance.
In response to the growing interestsabout themutual interdependence be-
that monetary policy is one of important policy instruments for controlling
property.
focus on the rationality of economic agents. Using a unique database, we test
whether professional forecasters forecasts rationally or behaviorally. Chapter
3 investigates into not only the rationality but also the homogeneity of indi-
vidual forecasters. We test both of them in order to verify the assumption
of the traditional economic theory. Chapter 4 examines the mutual depen-
professional forecasters. Chapter 5 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Financial Markets Forecasts
Revisited: Are They Rational,
Stubborn or Jumpy?
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we test whether professional forecasters forecast rationally
or behaviorally using a unique database, QSS database. This survey includes
forecasts on both stock prices and bond yields for various time horizons. The
history of forecasts made by a particular individual forecaster can be also
tracked.
Testing rationality of decision{making, including forecasting, is not a new
subject. There have been a vast and growing number of studies from both
theoretical and empirical perspectives. The seminal study by Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) shows the possibility that the decision{making is not per-
fectly rational and rather heuristic1. Decision makers tend to use a simple
1Heuristics
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rule such as anchoring, where the decision is based on some uninformative
targets.2 In particular, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) report that answers
to such a simple but unfamiliar question as \how many countries in Africa
number suggested by theWheel of Fortune. Kahneman and Knetsch (1993),
Wansinket al. (1998), and Beggs and Graddy (2009) also showsimilar results
ularly forecasting behavior taken by analysts or professional forecasters. De
excessive agreement among analyst predic-
tions, that is, a surprising degree of consensus relative to the predictability
of corporate earning. Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) raise the possibility of
rational cheating, a tendency to mimic able forecasters.3 Cooper et al. (2001)
empirically support this rational cheating using analysts' performances, and
Grinblatt et al. (1995), Graham (1999), and Welch (2000) also report similar
results for mutual fund managers. Park and Sabourian (2011) investigate
the relationship between herding and contrarian behavior.4 Ashiya (2009)
professional forecasts for the Fed Funds futures market.
Previous studies also report behavioral biases in terms of sensitivity of
people use and the biases to which they are prone in various tasks of judgment under
uncertainty, including predictions and evaluations of evidence.
2For the developments in studies on anchoring, see Chapman and Johnson (2002).
3Ichiue and Yuyama (2009) point out that Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) develop a
model in which less-able professional forecasters rationally choose to change their forecasts
by smaller amounts than the changes in their beliefs, if able forecasters do not have to
change their forecasts by large amounts since their forecasts are relatively accurate. This
mimicking strategy by less-able forecasters contributes to concealing their inferior skills
and to keeping the relationship with their clients, the users of forecasts. See Ichiue and
Yuyama (2009).
4
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forecasts to new information. For example, Abarbanell and Bernard (1992)
show that security analysts under-react to earnings information. Amir and
Ganzach(1998) usetheInstitutionalBrokersEstimateSystem(IBES) database
sions are positive and under-react when the forecast revisions are negative.
Using the forecasts on the GDP in Japan, Ashiya (2003) reports that fore-
casters tend to over-react to new information.
Werevisit biasesof forecasting behaviorwithanew, uniquedatabase. The
estimation results show that (i) professional forecasts are behavioral, namely,
stock{ bond
dissonance: while forecasting behavior in the stockmarket seems to be stub-
born in the sense that forecasts stick to previous forecasts or under-react to
new information, forecasting behavior in the bond market seems to be jumpy
in the sense that forecasts tend to be negatively related to past forecasts or
over-react to unexpected information. Wealso showthat forecasting behavior
such as Hong et al. (2000) and Lamont (2002), but is consistent with the
results in Ashiya and Doi (2001).
These are new results and altogether imply a complex forecasting behav-
market. This might be caused by the fact that many respondents do not
report for both stock and bond markets, and that the composition of the
ers. Findings reported by Ashiya (2009) and Nakazono (2012) seem to be
14
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 shows
the details of the data used in this chapter and estimation strategy. Then,
we report estimation results in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2.2 Estimation
2.2.1 The QSS data
TheQSS(QUICKSurvey Systemwhich isprovided byQUICK corp) monthly
conducts the paper-based surveys of forecasts as well as attitudes made by
cludes forecasts on both stock prices and bond yields for various time hori-
zons (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). We use forecasts on the stock prices (TOPIX)
and newly-issued JGB yields (5-year, 10-year and 20-year maturities) for the
one-, three-, and six month horizons. Each respondent is asked to answer a
asset managements, investment advisers, banks, trust banks, life insurances,
general insurances, and pension funds. On average, we have approximately
150 forecasts eachmonth. We can also track the history of forecastsmade by
a particular individual forecaster.
The QSS launched surveys of TOPIX in June 2000. For bond yields,
surveys of 20-year bond started in April 2003, those of 10-year bond in July
1998, and those of 5-year bond inMay 2001. In this chapter, we use the data
up until November 2010.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the means and the one standard deviation
yield for 3-month horizon, respectively. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 indicate that ex
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post realized stock prices and JGB yields move within around one standard
deviation of forecasts.
2.2.2 Estimation strategy
Do professional forecasters determine their own forecasts rationally or behav-
by their own past forecasts or publicly available past mean forecasts.
In this chapter, St! t+ n denotes a survey forecast conducted in period t
of the stock price or bond yields in period t + n, and Kt+ n denotes ex post
realized value in period t + n. Since we have a panel data set, we have two
forecast S and the second is the individual i's forecast Si. Et denotes the
expectation operator under rational expectations.
Following Ichiue and Yuyama (2009), we consider a partial adjustment
model of survey forecasts:
Sit! t+ n = it k! t+ n + (1 )EitKt+n; (2.1)
where measures the degree of the inertia in survey forecasts. Naturally, if
= 0, the current survey forecasts Sit! t+ n are equal to the rational expec-
tations conditional on the information available in period t, namely EtKt+ n.
6
transformed into
Kt+ n Sit! t+ n = (Sit! t+ n Sit k! t+ n) + it! t+ n; (2.2)
16
where
= 1 ;
and
i
t! t+ n = Kt+ n EitKt+ n:
t! t+ n denotes the forecast error, which is not predictable from information
known in period t under rational expectations. As a result, we can test a null
hypothesis of = 0, that implies rational forecasts, by estimating equation
(2.2).5 6 When 6= 0, forecasts are behavioral. Especially when 0,
forecasts are pulled by past forecasts and therefore are considered stubborn.
When 0, the current forecast tends to be revised more widely than the
changes in the rational expectations, and toward opposite directions from
past forecasts. Such forecast is considered jumpy.
When testing rationality of forecasts, we examine three cases depending
gregate past mean forecasts, namely S on S; (Case B) individual forecasts on
aggregate past mean forecasts, namely Si on S; (Case C) individual forecasts
on individual past forecasts namely Si on Si. Regarding the combinations of
(n;k), we examine three cases: (n;k) = (1; 2), (3; 3) or (1; 5).
and (CaseC). We divide forecasts into three categories: (1) all, (2) more than
1 year of experiences, and (3) more than 2 years of experience. Since mean
for each category (1), (2) and (3) is not publicly available, we always use S
5Note that a constant term is not included in the regression, since the forecast errors
of market expectations t! t+ n should be unbiased at least ex ante, according to Nordhaus
(1987). Thus if the estimated forecast errors are biased, we interpret the biases as a sample
artifact.
6Inestimation, standard errors are computed using the robust variancematrix estimator
proposed by Newey and West (1987) or Arellano (1987) in case that residuals are serially
correlated.
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as reference forecasts.7
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Aggregate data
Table 2.3 shows the estimation results in (Case A), namely and = 1+
from
Kt+ n St! t+ n = (St! t+ n St k! t+ n) + t! t+ n:
All and 8 As have
been reported in such previous studies as Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996),
cant, positive implies that current forecasts in the stock market stick or
are anchored
forecasting in the bond market. Below, we will inquire into this forecasting
behavior in more detail using individual forecasts.
2.3.2 Individual data
Reliance on aggregate mean forecast
Table 2.4 shows the estimation results in (Case B), namely and = 1+
from
Kt+ n Sit! t+ n = (Sit! t+ n St k! t+ n) + it! t+ n: (2.3)
7Average months of experience are 20.18 for TOPIX, 18.71 for 20-year bond, 17.44 for
10-year bond, and 18.78 for 5-year bond.
8Standard errors are computed using Newey and West (1987) estimator.
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Even when forecasting behavior is evaluated with micro individual forecasts,
9; the positive
suggests that forecasters stick to past consensus. On the other hand, regard-
ing forecasts on bond yields, all and
to the results here, forecasting behavior in the bond market is considered
jumpy. Professional forecasters have a tendency to revise their forecasts to
the opposite directions from the previous consensus.10
Results so far exhibit a stock{bond dissonance: while forecasting behavior
in the stockmarket is considered stubborn, individual forecasters in the bond
market are characterized jumpy. These results are new and altogether imply
Reliance on individual forecast
We seek for the reason behind the stock{bond dissonance by looking into the
individual forecasting behavior, namely estimating how individual forecasts
are related to their ownpast forecasts. Table 2.5 shows the estimation results
in (Case C), namely and = 1+ from
Kt+ n Sit! t+ n = (Sit! t+ n Sit k! t+ n) + it! t+ n: (2.4)
Forecasts in the stock market are stubborn or under-react to unexpected in-
formation, namely having a tendency to follow their past individual forecasts.
On the other hand, those in the bond market are considered to be jumpy or
over-react to new available information. Consequently, forecasts tend to be
revised drastically and quite often to the opposite directions from their own
9Standard errors in Cases B and C are computed using the robust variance matrix
estimator proposed by Arellano (1987) .
10This forecasting behavior is also called bold in the literature. For the intuitive expla-
nation of the bold forecast, please refer to the Figure 1 in Clement and Tse (2005).
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previous forecasts.
those of (CaseC). There are contrasting tendencies between the two markets;
in the stockmarket, j j in (CaseB) is smaller than that of (CaseC). However,
j j in (Case B) is larger than that of (Case C) in the bond market. These
weights on past individual forecasts than past consensus while forecasters
in the bond market tend to revise current forecasts more drastically from
previous consensus than past individual forecasts. The opposite outcomes
Estimation results in this chapter show that even in the same country,
in the bondmarket. Thismight be caused by the fact that many respondents
do not report for both stock and bond markets, and that the composition of
casters. Findings reported by Ashiya (2009) and Nakazono (2012) seem to be
Hong et al. (2000) conclude that experienced forecasters are more likely to
provide bold forecasts than inexperienced forecasters. Lamont (2002) also
the other hand, Ashiya and Doi (2001) report that forecasting behavior is
20
Table2.6and2.7showtheestimationresults for (CaseB) inequation(2.3)
and (CaseC) in equation (2.4) respectively by experience. We cannot observe
2.4 Conclusion
stock-bond
dissonance: while forecasting behavior in the stockmarket seems to be stub-
born, forecasting behavior in the bond market seems to be jumpy. Forecast-
experience as professional forecasters.
bond markets are novel. Using the QSS data we use, Yamamoto and Hirata
(2012) examine the determinants of the expectation heterogeneity and show
the heterogeneity of expectation. While Yamamoto and Hirata (2012) focus
on the Japanese stock markets, we use the QSS data on the stock market
as well as the bond market and lead to the contrasting results between two
quantitative easing policy conducted by the Bank of Japan. But, Nakazono
21
forecasting behavior in the stock and bond markets in Japan. Therefore, the
opposite outcomes from two markets contribute to a better understanding of
forecasting behavior of market participants.
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Table 2.1: Questionnaires in the QSS: Forecasts on stock prices
Stock price Period Time horizon of forecast
NIKKEI 225 April 1994 { November 2010 1, 3, 6 months
TOPIX June 2000 { November 2010 1, 3, 6 months
JASDAQ June 2000 { November 2010 1, 3, 6 months
23
Table 2.2: Questionnaires in the QSS: Forecasts on newly-issued JGB yields
Bond yields Period Time horizon of forecast
20-year bond April 2003 { November 2010 1, 3, 6 months
10-year bond July 1998 { November 2010 1, 3, 6 months
5-year bond May 2001 { November 2010 1, 3, 6 months
24
Table 2.3: Estimation results (Case A)
Stock Price / Interest Rates (n,k)
(1,2) 0:229** 0:186
TOPIX (3,3) 0:443** 0:307
(1,5) 0:101** 0:092
(1,2) 0:097 0:089
20y (3,3) 0:001 0:001
(1,5) 0:036 0:037
(1,2) 0:053 0:050
10y (3,3) 0:213 0:271
(1,5) 0:047 0:049
(1,2) 0:105 0:095
5y (3,3) 0:042 0:044
(1,5) 0:024 0:025
Note: Standard errors are computed using the robust variance matrix
estimator which is proposed by Newey and West (1987). ** denotes
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Table 2.4: Estimation results (Case B)
Stock Price / Interest Rates (n,k)
(1,2) 0:004 0:004
TOPIX (3,3) 0:036** 0:035
(1,5) 0:041** 0:039
(1,2) 0:108** 0:121
20y (3,3) 0:264** 0:359
(1,5) 0:119** 0:135
(1,2) 0:093** 0:102
10y (3,3) 0:357** 0:554
(1,5) 0:105** 0:118
(1,2) 0:082** 0:090
5y (3,3) 0:271** 0:372
(1,5) 0:090** 0:098
Standard errors are computed using the robust variance matrix estimator
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Table 2.5: Estimation results (Case C)
Stock Price / Interest Rates (n,k)
(1,2) 0:080** 0:074
TOPIX (3,3) 0:167** 0:143
(1,5) 0:055** 0:052
(1,2) 0:012 0:013
20y (3,3) 0:108** 0:122
(1,5) 0:062** 0:066
(1,2) 0:002 0:002
10y (3,3) 0:164** 0:196
(1,5) 0:039** 0:041
(1,2) 0:002 0:001
5y (3,3) 0:122** 0:139
(1,5) 0:047** 0:049
Note: Standard errors are computed using the robust variance matrix
27
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Figure 2.1: Forecast on TOPIX for 3-month horizon
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Figure 2.2: Forecast on 10-year JGB yield for 3-month horizon
31
Chapter 3
Heterogeneity and Anchoring in
Financial Markets
3.1 Introduction
and the rationality of the expectation formations using a rich individual sur-
vey, QSS (QUICK Survey System), provided by QUICK corporation.
things. First, participants in Japanese stock markets are not homogeneous;
position of the rational market theory, while past literatures claim that mar-
ket participats are heterogeneous. For example, Lamont (2002) discusses that
32
of \wishful expectations".
Second, themajority of market participants {even institutional investors{
predicts stockprices irrationally; inmost cases, forecasts by respondents tend
market conditions. These results may be caused by compensation structure
ticipants are homogeneous and rational.
A number of empirical studies exist regarding whether the expectation
formations are homogeneous and rational. Through empirical research on
stock markets in the United States, Fama (1970) concludes that with but a
there are investors behaving irrational.1
all available information is too strong and far from human capability.
Furthermore, Tversky and Kahneman (1974), in the decision-making un-
der uncertainty, say that you are unable to complete the decision-making
biases in judgments reveal some heuristics of thinking under uncertainty and
propose to call as anchoring a phenomenon that judgment under uncertainty
1See, Simon (1955) and Simon (1956)
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tends to yield irrational estimates, which are biased toward the initial values.
bond yields, exchange rates, etc. As for forecasting Japanese stock prices and
bond yields, Fujiwara et al. (2012) show that forecasts made by market par-
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2, we explain the data
and estimation strategy. Section 3 provides estimation results. Section 4
concludes.
3.2 Data and estimation strategy
3.2.1 The QSS data
We use the QSS (QUICK Survey System) provided by QUICK corp. The
QSS is important in conducting broad and continuing surveys about mar-
ket participants' sentiments. From July 1996, it asks market participants
monthly about their views on equity prices, bond yields, and the real econ-
institutions (see Table 3.1). The QSS is an unbalanced panel and asks about
150 people per month.
Among many survey items, we focus on surveys on expectations about
stock prices (see Table 3.2). As for stock prices, we useNIKKEI 225, TOPIX
34
and JASDAQ. For each, 1, 3, and 6-months ahead expectations of the stock
prices are available. QSS enables us to classify and analyze the data to each
3.2.2 Estimation strategy
on equity prices are homogeneous or not. CAPM assumes the homogeneous
expectations. If the assumption is reasonable, the expected rates of return
by any market participants are homogeneous.
For testing homogeneities, we estimate the following model for each type of
j ),
Sit! t+ n St! t+ n
St! t+ n
= j + "it+ n; (3.1)
where Sit! t+ n denotes an individual i's survey forecast conducted in period t
of the stock price in period t + n, St! t+ n denotes the average of Sit! t+ n for
all i j
trust banks, and insurance companies. The null hypothesis is that survey
35
forecasts made by the type j
that is j = 0.
et al. (2012) clarify that forecasts made by market participants in Japan
model of survey forecasts as in Ichiue and Yuyama (2009):
Sit! t+ n = it k! t+ n + (1 )Eit[Kt+n]; (3.2)
where measures the degree of the inertia in expectation. Naturally, if = 0,
the current survey forecasts by individual i, Sit! t+ n, are equal to the mar-
ket expectations conditional on the information available at time t, namely
Eit[Kt+ n]. Here, 0 1 implies that the current survey forecasts are in-
equation (3.2) can be further rewritten as
Kt+ n Sit! t+ n = 1 (S
i
t! t+ n Sit k! t+ n) + it! t+ n; (3.3)
where
= 1 ;
and
i
t! t+ n Kt+ n Eit[Kt+n]:
i
t! t+ n denotes the forecast errors of the market expectations, which are not
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predictable from information known in period t under rational expectations.
Thus, it! t+ n should be considered white noise. As a result, we can test
whether the degree of the inertia is nonzero or, in other words, a null
hypothesis of = 0, by regressing equation (3.3)2 3.
3.3 Estimation results
3.3.1 Homogeneity
sors, \Banks" consists of bankand trust bank, \Ins." consists of life insurance
According to the estimation results, the heterogeneity exists in every clas-
from the mean of individual forecasts in almost all cases: the null hypoth-
esis, = 0, is rejected in about 84% of the cases. This estimation results
are inconsistent with the above assumption of CAPM orMPT. Furthermore,
note that looking at the second row of Table 3.3, the estimated values of
2Note that a constant term is not included in the regression, since the forecast errors
of market expectations it! t+ n should be unbiased at least ex ante. Thus if the estimated
forecast errors are biased, we interpret the biases as a sample artifact. Ichiue and Yuyama
(2009).
3Inestimation, standard errors are computed using the robust variancematrix estimator
proposed by Arellano (1987) in case that residuals are serially correlated.
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estimation results are showed in Tables 3.4 to 3.6. Table 3.4 covers the full
sample period and this sample periods is divided into two, one of which is
respectively.
The estimation results suggest the following three points. First, Table 3.4
cases reject the null hypothesis, H0: = 0. This result is supported by Table
on stock prices every month are conscious about their consistency between
present and past forecasts. Considerapersonwho is responsible for informing
their customers about stock price forecasts. Such a person as an investment
advisor may anchor her present forecast to her past forecast because if she
suddenly changed their perspective drastically for stock markets, she would
have to explain what had fundamentally changed and why they had been
3.4 indicates that we fail to reject H0 during the full sample period. Fur-
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the heterogeneity of foreign securities is also worthy of mentioning because
their forecasts are more cautious than the overall average in all indices. One
possibility of the heterogeneity of foreign securities may come from the com-
Japanese companies.
in 34 out of 45 cases (76%). Moreover, the values of are higher than those
of Table 3.4, which means that forecasters weighted more strongly on their
that explains the behavioral forecasts by foreign security in sub sample 2may
Ho for
among foreign securities in sub sample 2. This evidence indicates that each
heavily weight on past forecasted values. The view of \panic forecasting"
seems to be consistent with Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) show that bounded rationality arises under uncertainty,
3.4 Conclusion
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Abbreviation
Inv. Investment advisor
Banks and Trust banks Bank BankTrust bank
Insurance companies Ins.
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Table 3.2: Questionnaires in the QSS
Item Period Time horizon of forecast
NIKKEI 225 April 1994 { November 2010 1, 3, 6 months
TOPIX June 2000 { November 2010 1, 3, 6 months
JASDAQ June 2000 { November 2010 1, 3, 6 months
42
Table 3.3: Test on homogeneity ( )
NIKKEI 225
Horizon 1M 3M 6M
0.97%** 2.13%** 2.43%**
0.13%** 0.19%* 0.06%
Banks and trust banks 0.24%** 0.54%** 0.66%**
Insurance companies 0.42%** 0.59%** 1.11%**
TOPIX
Horizon 1M 3M 6M
0.86%** 2.11%** 2.58%**
0.17%** 0.31%** 0.35%**
Banks and trust banks 0.38%** 0.81%** 1.08%**
Insurance companies 0.41%** 0.65%** 1.22%**
JASDAQ
Horizon 1M 3M 6M
0.57%** 1.38%** 1.80%**
0.01% 0.12% 0.06%
Banks and trust banks 0.14% 0.37% 0.28%
Insurance companies 0.37%** 0.42%** 0.64%**
and at the 1% and
5% levels, respectively.
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Chapter 4
Expectations in Japan
4.1 Introduction
macroeconomics and Keynesian economics predicts that evennominal distur-
because nominal wage and prices are rigid. From the standpoint of Keyne-
1 is examined both theo-
retically and empirically, for example, by Gali and Gertler (1999), Sbordone
Phillips Curve and suggest that the degree of price stickiness implied by the
estimates is substantial.
1
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Canova and Gambetti (2010), Nunes (2010), Ang et al. (2007), and Ball and
Croushore (2003). From an examination of the role of expectations during
the \Great Moderation", which started in the mid-1980s (Blanchard and Si-
mon (2001)), Canova and Gambetti (2010) suggest that expectations explain
It is natural that macroeconomists pay considerable attention not only
tations, particularly when central banks set the stance of monetary policy
data fromprofessional forecasters. Weexamine therelationship betweenmon-
expectations in Japan2.
mining monetary policy is widely known, very few studies have examined
2
and Weale (2006) focus on survey expectations and review models of expectations forma-
tion.
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ropean consumers. Ueda (2010) investigates the determinants of households'
changes in energy and food prices but also monetary policy shocks. Hori
and Shimizutani (2005) suggest that a series of quantitative easing monetary
policy announcements cause revision of price expectations only for a small
portion, i.e., 5{ 10% of people surveyed.
mainly utilize qualitative data. We, however, use quantitative data on in-
forecastsmade by professional forecasters. This avoids the need to transform
qualitative data into quantitative data via an appropriate approach, such as
the Carlson and Parkin (1975) method.
tion expectations, which are important in determining monetary policy. We
tive, quarterly data provided by households, but quantitative, monthly data
made by professional forecasters for Japan. The following two points sum-
that monetary policy is one of important policy instruments for controlling
49
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide
a structural vector autoregression (SVAR). In Section 3, we show estimation
results and robustness check. Section 4 concludes.
4.2 Data and estimation strategy
expectations in Japan by using a SVAR, following the estimation strategy
used in Ueda (2010). Assume that the true SVAR(n) model is the following:
A0Xt = A(L)Xt 1 + et; In = E[ete0t];
where Xt = (yt; it t et )0 is a vector of n endogenous variables, and A0 and
A(L L is the lag operator. Here Xt consists
of the monthly-output gap (y), short-term nominal interest rate (i
tion rate (
Economics ( e).
The output gap (y
= 14; 400).3 Short-
term nominal interest rates (i) are the uncollateralized overnight call rates
) are the change in
e) are
obtained from Consensus Economics. In addition, three exogenous variables
are included in our estimation. One is year-on-year oil price changes (dPoil)
taken from the Nikkei oil index, the second is year-on-year fresh food price
3
GDP, which is released by the Japan Center for Economic Research, by the Hodrick{
= 14; 400
(Backus and Kehoe (1992); Mise et al. (2005)).
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changes (dPf resh), and the third is consumption tax dummies, which take
the value of unity from April 1997 to March 1998, and zero otherwise. Our
sample period ranges from January 1994 to December 2010.
We use surveys conducted by Consensus Economics Inc. as monthly data
national surveys of professionals' economic forecasts. Since 1991, these sur-
veyshave covered estimates for principalmacroeconomic indicators, including
t (month m, year h) as et , as Gorter et al. (2008)
adopt the following equation:
e
t =
13 m
12
e
h +
m 1
12
e
h+ 1: (4.1)
derived from equation (4.1) and core consumer price index.
The structured shocks, et, are assumed to be mutually orthogonal, and
their variance-covariancematrix is a 4 4 identity matrix. The reduced form
of this SVAR is described as the following:
Xt 1Xt 1 + 4Xt 4 + "t; 4 = E["t"0t];
j = A 10 j j = A 10 (A 10 )0. The shocks, "t, are mutually corre-
lated.
We impose restrictions to identify the monetary policy shock. We adopt
the non-recursive scheme put forward by Ueda (2010) and impose 4 (4
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1)=2 = 6 zero restrictions on the matrix contemporaneous relationships A0.
By imposing the following restrictions on matrix A0,
A0 =
0
BBBBBB@
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 a24
a31 0 1 a34
a41 a42 a43 1
1
CCCCCCA
; (4.2)
we estimate the reduced form of a SVAR model with the restrictions on the
parameters of A0. The lag length is four, in line with the results from the
standard Akaike information criterion (AIC).
The restrictions on the parameters of A0 allow us to examine the concur-
y, i,
and . Thus, our estimation strategy enables concurrent interdependence of
because the responsesof output gap delay structural shocksof other variables.
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4.3 Estimation results
4.3.1 Main results
In this section, we present the description of data used and illustrate the
impulse responses of endogenous variables. Figure 4.2 shows the impulse
responses of the four endogenous variables to four structural shocks. Each
column represents a structural shock of one standard deviation and each row
represents the response of an endogenous variable. Dotted lines represent the
16th and 84th 4.
Thus, this shock is interpreted as the demand shock.
The second column illustrates the responses to a positive interest rate
shock in the monetary policy. The contractionary monetary policy shock
5 because the non-recursive
0:074, is larger than that of in-
0:
tion. These result suggest the presence of price stickiness.
4
5
tractionary monetary policy shock. See, for example, Sims (1992), Eichenbaum (1992),
and Hanson (2004).
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shock. This shock leads to increases in all variables. We also note that
On the whole, our estimation strategy and restrictions are valid because
these impulse responses appear reasonable and our results are consistent with
those of Ueda (2010).
4.3.2 Variance decompositions
Table 4.1 shows variance decompositions and contributions made by struc-
at horizons of 3, 12, 24, and 60 months.
negligible in the short run probably because of price stickiness, it increases
policy in the medium to long run. Finally, the contribution of the shock of
However, it increases to about 17% within 1{5 years. This implies the self-
54
4.3.3 Robustness check
We check robustness of these estimation results (1) by changing sample peri-
ods to January 1994 through December 2007 in Figure 4.3, (2) by changing
y from output gap to demean output, i.e. logarithm of monthly GDP minus
logarithm of average of monthly GDP in Figure 4.4, (3) by changing sample
periods to January 1994 through December 2001 in Figure 4.5, and (4) by
changing sample periods to January 1998 through December 2006 in Figure
4.6. As Figures 4.3 and 4.6 show, our robustness checks support the above
even when we change the sample for just covering `zero-interest-rate-policy'
(ZIRP) period from 1998 to 2006 in Figure 4.6. Hence, our estimation strat-
egy is plausible.
policy during the sub samplewhich cover from1994 to 2001. This response of
The possible reasonmay come fromdelay in liftingmonetary tightening after
the bursting of the bubble (Okina and Shiratsuka, 2002). Given the fact that
monetary policy fell behind the curve after the bursting bubble, the response
Although Figures 4.3 to 4.6 provide the reasonable impulse responses, we
need careful interpretation of the impulse responses, given the fact that the
samples cover ZIRP periods. We identify monetary policy shocks by using
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uncollateralized overnight call rate. Because thecall ratehardlymovedduring
ZIRP period, the strategy for identifying monetary policy shocks using the
overnight call rate which is almost zero, can be criticized as unappropriated.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that under ZIRP period wemay fail to
future research.
4.4 Conclusion
expectations, which are important in determiningmonetary policy. We study
quarterly data provided by households, but quantitative, monthly datamade
by professional forecasters for Japan.
The following two points summarize the contributions of this chapter.
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Table 4.1: Variance decomposition
y i e
T = 3 2:2 9:5 85:0 3:2
T = 12 20:8 24:7 43:8 10:8
T = 24 18:4 28:9 35:3 17:3
T = 60 18:4 28:9 35:1 17:6
y i e
T = 3 8:0 51:3 2:2 38:5
T = 12 8:0 45:4 4:4 42:2
T = 24 7:1 44:0 4:0 44:9
T = 60 7:0 43:5 4:0 45:6
57
e)
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Figure 4.2: Impulse responses to structural shocks from January 1994 to
December 2010
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Figure 4.3: Robustness check (1) Impulse responses to structural shocks from
January 1994 to December 2007
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Figure 4.4: Robustness check (2) Impulse responses to structural shocks from
January 1994 to December 2010
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Figure 4.5: Robustness check (3) Impulse responses to structural shocks from
January 1994 to December 2001
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Figure 4.6: Robustness check (4) Impulse responses to structural shocks from
January 1998 to December 2006
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary
Themotivationbehind thispaper is to examine theproperties of expectations
formation and analyze the interdependence between individuals' expectations
and economic activity.
InChapter 2, we test whether professional forecasts are rational or behav-
ioral with unique database, which includes forecasts on both stock prices and
bond yields for various time horizons. The estimation results show that (i)
by past forecasts, and (ii) thereexistsastock{ bonddissonance: while forecast-
ing behavior in the stockmarket seems to be stubborn, forecasting behavior in
the bond market seems to be jumpy. We also show that forecasting behavior
as professional forecasters.
Chapter 3 shows that the heterogeneity of market participants in Japan
Japanese stock markets forecasting. Motivation in Chapter 3 is to verify the
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homogeneity ofmarket participantsand the rationality of theexpectation for-
hypothesis is rejected in the sense that expectations formationmade by mar-
ket participants are heterogeneous and their forecasts tend to bias upward.
formation of expectations. Furthermore, the rationality is rejected; even in-
geneity and behavioral forecasts, are inconsistent with the assumption of the
Chapter 4 examines the relationship between monetary policy and in-
Interdependence between expectations formation and real economic activ-
data provided by households, but quantitative, monthly data made by pro-
monetary policy is one of important policy instruments to achieve low and
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5.2 Future research
5.2.1 Incentive structures behind biased behavior and
heterogeneity
Although we investigate how expectations are formed by agents and what
properties expectations have, our studies do not clarify the motivations of
agents behind the biased behavior. As we mentioned, the literature on
bounded-rationality, heterogeneity, or strategic behavior suggests that incen-
tive structures may motivate irrational behavior. For example, in Chapter 2,
in the sense that stubborn forecasts in the stockmarket and jumpy forecasts
in the bond marke1. Yet, we have not investigated the structural reason be-
hind thisdissonance. This requires amicroeconomic modelling of professional
forecasters.
The past studies about the incentive structures of forecasters based on a
microeconomic consideration point out that strategic behavior such as \repu-
in the bounded-rationality, the heterogeneity, or herding behavior. Ehrbeck
and Waldmann (1996), Graham (1999), Laster et al. (1999), Hong et al.
(2000), Welch (2000), Lamont (2002), and Ashiya (2009) suggest that strate-
gic behavior based on incentives prevents individuals from making rational
1
3. Reexamination of forecasting behavior with the updated data covering the European
sovereign crisis will clarify the reason why behavioral forecasting becomes stronger during
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forecasts. For example, Lamont (2002) provokes a discussion about the rea-
sonwhy the rationality of forecasts does not hold and implies that the agency
problembased on reputationmay explain the strategic behavior. In fact, La-
mont (2002) shows that if forecasters have an incentive that motivates them
to achieve reputation, the rationality of forecasts tends to be rejected.
The career-concern hypothesis is a dominant view, which explains the
bounded-rationality and heterogeneity. For example, Chevalier and Ellison
(1999) examine the labormarket formutual fundmanagersand identify possi-
ble implicit incentives created by the relationship between the fundmanagers'
performance and termination using data on the managers' career outcomes
and their performance. The shape of the termination-performance relation-
ship may give younger managers an incentive to avoid unsystematic risk and
to lead to \herding" behavior. This study also suggests that an agency prob-
lem can be the main cause of the irrationality and heterogeneity.
More and more empirical studies stimulate the theoretical analysis about
the incentive structures behind the behavioral forecasts and heterogeneity.
Avery and Chevalier (1999) develop a model of decision-making, which il-
luminates recent empirical work on career concerns. Avery and Chevalier
cient private information about their abilities thanks to abundant experience
no private information about ability early in their career. Their model de-
velops a theoretical framework for explaining the fact that the formation of
forecasts rely on experience. Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006) and Fehr and
of forecasts. They imply that heterogeneous processing of available informa-
tion may stems from the microeconomic incentives of forecasters.
This paper points out that the compensation structure and internal pro-
67
motion system may cause behavioral forecasts and the dissonance between
the stock and bond market participants. The dissonancemay be attributable
to volatility of the return between stock prices and bond yields, or the gap of
the investment horizon between stocks and bonds. Structural understanding
of the biased forecasts and the dissonance results, which may stem from the
microeconomic incentives is left for our future research.
5.2.2 Rational expectations versus adaptive expecta-
tions
Although there is extensive literature about the expectations formation, stud-
ies about the relationship between the expectations formation and real eco-
nomic activity as in Chapter 4, are now developing. In fact, the dynamics of
expectations has been widely discussed in academic journals such as Journal
of Economics Dynamics and Control, Macroeconomic Dynamics, Review of
Economic Dynamics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, etc.
Many contributions are added to the literature, where macroeconomists
pay considerable attention not only to the dynamics of the rational expec-
tations but also to that of the adaptive expectations (i.e. learning). For
example, Branch and McGough (2009) incorporate bounded rationality at
the individual agent level, and consider a case where a fraction of agents are
sess multiple equilibria in case of expectations heterogeneity. This is a novel
article in the sense that they study a new Keynesian monetary model with
heterogeneous expectations2.
As central bankershave great concernsabout the relationship between the
2See Branch and McGough (2009).
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adaptive expectations and monetary policy, Evans and Honkapohja (2003),
andMuto (2008), and Evans and Honkapohja (2009) provide the comprehen-
sive surveys about the adaptive expectations and monetary policy. Milani
(2007) presents an estimated model that departs from rational expectations
and nests learning by economic agents, using Bayesian methods. Further-
more, Milani (2007) empirically shows that when adaptive learning replaces
in the model economy mainly from adaptive expectations.
Findings obtained in the literature on learning imply the possibility that
when a representative agent forms adaptive expectations, the expectations
formation of learning-type attributes to the macroeconomic dynamics. Or,
ket participants attribute to a boom-and-burst mechanism in stockmarkets?
One way to analyze the dynamics and the interaction between `rational' and
`adoptive' agents is by the overlapping generations model, where the young
and old, for example, are assumed to be rational and adaptive, respectively.
Another way for further research can be based on numerical simulation as
in Novales (2010). The theoretical and numerical analyses based on various
types of expectations formation are also left for future research.
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